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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KILEY MILLER and JOHN RZECZYCKI
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Plaintiffs/ Appellants
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iNC. AND STATE OF UTAH by and through
the SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION, and
JOHN and JANE DOES 1-5
Defendants/ Appelles.

Appeal from the Seventh District Court, San Juan County, Judge Lyle R. Anderson
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Paul Mortensen
Hanks & Mortensen
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Deputy San Juan County Attorney
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Attorney for SITLA:
Thomas A. Mitchell
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Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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Bruce R. Baird (#0176)
Alain C. Balmanno (#3985)
HUTCHLNGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL
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Sandy, Utah 84070
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
a. i) The Court below ruled that an Order in a prior case between these parties was
binding on the parties in a new action, although the Order in the prior case read "this
ruling applies only to this action and, except in this action, shall have no affect of legal or
factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue preclusion on the parties
hereto, those in privity with them, or on any other persons or action."
In its decision, the Court below relied on language in Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). This
is an error of law because Rule 41(b) is not applicable to the Order in the prior case
which was a grant of summary judgment to the Defendants/Appellees, not a dismissal of
an action.
ii) Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's application of rule
41(b) for correctness. C&YCorp. v. Gen. Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995).
b. i) The Court below further held that the Order in the prior case was effective to create
claim preclusion. This was also error because res judicata is claim preclusion, and res
judicata was expressly withheld from the application of the Order in the prior case,
ii) Standard of Review. The determination of whether res judicata bars an action
presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Macris & Assocs. v.
Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, P17, 16 P.3d 1214.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Nature of the case: This appeal is from a final Order of Dismissal with
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Pi CJudice issued by the Honorable Judge Lyle R Anderson, in the Seventh Judicial
District Court for San Juan County, Utah, on a motion to dismiss made by
Defendants/Appellees
b Course of the proceedings Plaintiffs/Appellants (the 'Landowners') filed a
complaint seeking declaratory, injunctive relief and damages for wrongful use of
Plaintiffs' land by the Defendants/Appellees ('RR4W and the County' or 'Defendants')
The claims were essentially the same as those forming the basis of a prior case between
the same parties, decided by the same lower Court m March 2006 The Defendants filed
a Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice, arguing 1) issue preclusion, 2) res
judicata, 3) no means of meaningful relief, and 4) bad faith on the parts of the Plaintiffs
The Landowners opposed the Motion to Dismiss, noting the Order m the prior case
piovided that "this mhng applies only to this action and, except in this action, shall have
no affect of legal or factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue
preclusion on the parties hereto, those m privity with them, or on any other persons or
action "
c Disposition at trial court The Court below issued its ruling granting the
Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Order in the prior case "does not state that the Order
is a dismissal without prejudice or that it does not operate as an adjudication upon the
merits " The Court below applied Rule 41(b) to its prior Order, and concluded that the
ordei m the prior case is "most reasonably interpreted to eliminate any issue preclusion
effect of the Older in any other dispute involving" these parties
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RELEVANT FACTS
All relevant facts are taken form the trial court's Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice (Order), which is attached to this Brief.
1. This case involves the same parties and the same claims as one previously
decided by the same trial court in March 2005. Order at 1.
2. The Order in the prior case contained the following language in its paragraph
2(c): 'This ruling applies only to this action and, except in this action, shall have no
affect of legal or factual precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue
preclusion on the parties hereto, those in privity with them, or on any other persons or
action." Order at 2.
3. The Order in the prior case was a grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants/Appelles. Order at 3. 1
The issues presented in this appeal turn on the meaning of the language in
paragraph 2(c) of the Order in the prior case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Landowners argue that:

1

The Order in the prior case strangely held that the Plaintiffs had acquired the property
subject to a temporary easement of indefinite duration. Order at 2. One strains to
understand how a temporary easement can be of indefinite duration. The Trial Court so
held in spite of the fact that no easement was recorded against the property when
Plaintiffs purchased the property, that Red Rock 4-Wheeler and San Juan County failed
to seek a permanent easement when they could have, that SITLA denied having any
obligation to grant such an easement (and denying that the statute in question provides for
such an easement), and that public notice was given by SITLA that the property was
being sold and that the temporary easement would thus be extinguished.
6

1. Rule 41(b) does not apply to the Order in the prior case because Rule 41(b)
applies to dismissals and the Order in the prior case granted summary judgment pursuant
to Rule 56. Rule 41(b) must be interpreted in accordance with the plain language of the
Rule.
2. Even if Rule 41(b) did apply to the Order in the prior case, the language of
paragraph 2(c) of that order specifically limited the application of the Order in future
cases. The language of paragraph 2(c) is clear and unambiguous, and limits the
application of the Order by providing that the ruling is to have no affect of legal or
factual precedent, no res judicata, no collateral estoppel, and no issue preclusion on the
parties to the first case.
3. Trial courts have the power to limit the preclusive effect of rulings, and to
curtail the application of res judicata and claim preclusion.
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Rule 4Kb) does not apply to the Order in the prior case, and its application was error.
Rule 41(b) applies to dismissal of actions. See text of Rule 41(b) in Addendum.
Courts interpreting Rule 41 do so according to the plain language of the Rule. First
Equity Fed, Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56 1fl[ 13 and 16; 52 P.3d 1137 (we
therefore construe Rule 41 ... to mean exactly what it says"); Beaver County v. Qwest,
Inc., 2001 UT 81 t 19; 31 P.3d 1147.
The Rule is titled "Dismissal of actions." Rule 41(b) applies when a defendant
moves for dismissal of a claim upon failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
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the rules of evidence or to obey any order of the court. It also applies when the court is
the trier of fact as when a matter is tried to the court without a jury, and the court
determines that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof.
Courts applying Rule 41(b) must weigh the evidence and decide its sufficiency.
Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1988); Handy v. Union
Pacific R.R., 841 P. 2d 1210 (Utah App. 1992). The procedure for a court to grant
summary judgment is completely different. A court granting summary judgment is
specifically precluded from weighing the evidence, and can only grant summary
judgment if there are no issues of material facts. See e.g. W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio
Natural resources Co., 627 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1981). Because the Order in the prior case
was a grant of summary judgment, Rule 41(b) did not apply to that Order.
2. The language of the Order in the prior case limits its res judicata and claim preclusion
effect.
Paragraph 2(c) of the Order in the prior case specifically limits the application of
that Order. That language is clear, and on its face, allows the filing of this new action.
The ruling is to have no affect of legal or factual precedent, no res judicata, no collateral
estoppel, and no issue preclusion on the parties to the first case. Specifically, the
language of paragraph 2(c) states:
This ruling applies only to this action and, except in this
action, shall have no affect of legal or factual precedent, res
judicata, collateral estoppel or other issue preclusion on the
parties hereto, those in privity with them, or on any other
persons or action.
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That language says that the ruling shall have no legal affect on the parties, "except in this
[First Case]". The First Case ended when the time for appeal on that case expired. The
language of Paragraph 2C specifically precludes the application of "res judicata,
collateral estoppel or other issue preclusion" to the parties in any subsequent action.
"Except in this [First Case]" the order has no legal affect "on the parties hereto".
The Court below concluded that if the Order in the previous case was interpreted
as suggested by the Landowners, the Order in the previous case would have no effect in
resolving the claims presented in that case. Order at 4. The Landowners submit that is
exactly the effect of the plain language of paragraph 2(c) of the Order in the prior case.
In its holding the Trial Court reasoned that the language in paragraph 2(c) is "most
reasonably interpreted to eliminate any issue preclusion effect of the Order in any other
dispute" between the parties, noting that "the parties were understandably concerned
about the effect of the Order on any other disputes that might arise." Id at 3-4. The Trial
Court may have been right had the language of paragraph 2(c) provided that the Order
would 'not have res judicata effect as to any future issues, not decided in this Order,
which may arise between the parties and their privies.' But that is not what the Order in
the prior case provides. It does not limit itself to future claims not adjudicated in the first
case. It states quite clearly that the ruling applies only to that action, not to the issues
raised in that action.
The Trial Court also observed that it would not have signed the prior Order if any
one had "hinted that the order failed to [operate as an adjudication on the merits, and
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finally resolve this dispute between these parties]." Order at 3. No matter what the
Court intended, the Order reads as written, and the interpretation suggested by the Trial
Court and by the Defendants is more than a perfunctory or clerical mistake the Court can
correct on its own motion. See Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P. 2d 827 (1956).
Nor is this a situation where the Trial Court can, by operation of its Order in the
second case, modify pursuant to Rule 60(b), its order entered in the first case. The
language in paragraph 2(c), whatever its intent, should be interpreted on its own plain
meaning at this juncture.
3. Trial Courts have the authority to limit the preclusive effect of decisions.
As observed by Justice Blakmun, concurring in Federated Department Stores v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), "there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must
give way to ... overriding concerns of public policy and simple justice." Justice
Blakmun also quoted from Moore's Federal Practice that "just as res judicata is
occasionally qualified by an overriding, competing principle of public policy, so
occasionally it needs an equitable tempering."
The argument that res judicata is not without its exceptions, is not foreign to Utah
jurisprudence. Utah law recognizes that defining the scope of a claim or cause of action
is not an exact science, and that claim preclusion may at times be driven by the relative
importance of the finality of the prior judgment. See American Estate Mgmt Corps v.
International Inv. & Dev. Corps, 1999 UT App 232, 986 P.2d 765. Moreover, Utah
courts have also recognized that in some situation judicial economy and the convenience
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afforded by the finality of legal controversies do not override other concerns. See e.g. In
reJJ.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In this case the concern which needs to be protected is that the plain language and
plain meaning of court orders must be protected, once those orders are final.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should reverse the Order below, and return the case to the
Trial Court for further proceedings. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be
denied.
DATED this J ^ / i ^ d a y of October 2007.
HUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL PLLC

CO!
Bruce R Baird
Alain C. Balmanno
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correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served by mail, postage
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8 East Broadway, Suite 740
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2204
Thomas A. Mitchell
SITLA
675 East 500 South, Suite 500
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Deputy San Juan County Attorney
117 South Main
PO Box 9
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Addendum

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KILEY
MILLER
RZECZYCKI,

and

JOHN

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah
Political Subdivision, RED
ROCK 4-WHEELERS, INC., and
JOHN and JANE DOES, and STATE
OF UTAH by and through SCHOOL
AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS
ADMINISTRATION, and JOHN DOES
1-5,
Defendants .

Case No.0707-33

I

This court is called upon to decide whether the order entered
in the earlier case involving these same parties and the same
dispute operates to bar the claims now asserted by plaintiffs. The
court rules that it does.
The order of this court in Miller, v. San Juan County, Civil
No. 0407-37, is found by merging the Order dated March 3, 2005,
with the Order Modifying March 3, 2005 Order and

Dismissing

Defendants' Supplemental Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaints.
As thus merged, it reads as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied.
Plaintiffs erroneously argue that persons who historically
obtained a permit for the Jeep Safari cannot benefit from a

public easement. There is at least a genuine issue of fact
about whether the public enjoys an easement to traverse
plaintiffs' property. Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc. (URR4W") and
members of the public participating in the Jeep Safari have no
less right to traverse plaintiffs1 property than the general
public.
2. Defendants' motions
granted as follows:

for partial

summary

judgment

are

A. Uncontradicted evidence having been presented that the
Strike Ravine trail had been constructed and maintained
or used by a responsible authority and existed prior to
January 1, 1992, the court determines that San Juan
County (the "County") holds for the public, and RR4W,
holds for its own uses pursuant to Section 75-5-201, Utah
Code, a temporary public easement or right-of-way to use
the Strike Ravine trail. All members of the public have
the right to travel the Strike Ravine trail. This
temporary public easement was not extinguished when the
State of Utah sold the land across which the Strike
Ravine trail passes to the plaintiffs. The purpose a
member of the public has in traveling the Strike Ravine
trail is irrelevant.
B. Plaintiffs acquired the property subject to the
temporary easement. The temporary easement exists until
a permanent easement is established under Section 72-5203(2). Under plaintiffs' and State Institutional and
Trust Lands Administration's
{"SI TLA") position no
permanent easement can be granted (unless the property
reverts to SITLA). This means the temporary easement is
of indefinite duration. Only if plaintiffs were to
forfeit under the certificate of sale or if SITLA were to
otherwise resume all equitable as well as legal title
would RR4W and the County potentially be able to apply
for a permanent easement.
C. This ruling applies only to this action and, except in
this action, shall have no effect of legal or factual
precedent, res judicata, collateral estoppel or other
issue preclusion on the parties hereto, those in privity
with them, or on any other persons or actions.
Plaintiffs argue that, once a new action is filed, the Order
in Civil No. 0407-3 7 has no further effect. In effect, plaintiffs

argue that their claims in Civil No. 0407-37 were dismissed without
prejudice and can now be relitigated. The County and RR4W argue
that paragraph 2.C. only operates to limit the effect of the Order
to this particular dispute.
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. provides as follows:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
provides... any dismissal... operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.
This court certainly intended that its decision, reached only
after several hearings, and mind-bending analysis of che pertinent
statutes, would operate as an adjudication on the merits, and
finally resolve this dispute between these parties. Had anyone
hinted that the Order failed to accomplish that, this court would
have refused to sign the Order until after appropriate changes had
been made.
Nevertheless, whatever the court intended, it must consider
whether the Order has a different effect. The court rules that it
does not for the following reasons:
1. Paragraph 2.C. does not state that the Order is a dismissal
without prejudice or that it does not operate as an adjudication on
the merits. The Order must therefore be read as an adjudication
upon the merits of the presented claims. An adjudication upon the
merits is a final resolution of presented claims with prejudice.
2. Paragraph 2.C. is most reasonably interpreted to eliminate

any "issue preclusion" effect of the Order in any other dispute
involving SITLA, RR4W, the County, or plaintiffs. Because of the
peculiar and puzzling nature of this dispute, the parties were
understandably concerned about the effect of the Order on any other
disputes that might arise. However, they clearly intended that the
Order have "claim preclusion" effect in "this action," namely Civil
No. 040 7-2 7. To read paragraph 2.C. as plaintiffs advocate would
mean that the Order had no effect in resolving the claims presented
in Civil No. 0407-37.
The

claims presented

by plaintiffs

in

this

case

being

identical to those raised and dismissed in Civil No. 0407-37,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs complaint be dismissed
with prejudice. Defendants' request for attorney fees is denied
because

defendants

have

not

claimed,

much

less

shown,

plaintiffs' arguments are completely lacking in merit.
No further Order of the court is required.
DATED this ^f^day of May, 2007.

that

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, hand delivered, or faxed, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice, this cxQ

day of May, 2 0 07, to the following:

Paul W. Mortensen
Hanks & Mort ens en, P.C.
Attorney for Defendants Red Rock 4-Wheelers, Inc.
8 East Broadway, Suite 740
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Bruce R. Baird
Hutchings Baird Curtis & Astill, P.L.L.C.
9537 South 700 East
Sandy, UT 84070
Walter J. Bird
Deputy San Juan County Attorney
PO Box 9
Monticello, UT 84535
Thomas A. Mitchell
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration
675 East 500 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
&

Deputfy Court Clerk

Rule 41 Dismissal of actions.
(d) Voluntary dismissal effect thereof
UiA1) By plaintiff Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i) and of any applicable statute, an
d( tion may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before set vice by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under tnese
rules Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim
(a)(2) By order of court Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule an action may only be dismissed at the tequest of the plaintiff on order of the court
based either on
»/(2)(i) a stipu.ation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action 01
(a)(2)(n) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper If a counterclaim has been pleaded by
a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
^'judication by the couit Unless otherwise specified in the order a dismissal under this paragraph is
without prejudice
fb) Involuntary dismissal effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules
ot any order of court a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him After the
^ untiff in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief The court as
trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render
any judgment until the close of all the evidence If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a) Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits
(O Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim The provisions of this rule apply to the
dismissal of any counterclaim cross-claim, or third-party claim A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone
pursuant to Paiagraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive pleading is
served or, if there is none before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing
(Jj Costs of previously-dismissed action If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action jn any court
commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant the court may
make such oiderfoi the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem pioper and may
stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order
e Bona or undertaking to be dehveied to adveise paity Should a party dismiss his complaint
, unterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(i) above, after a provisional
r
~ nedy has been allowed such party the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy
must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was
obtained

